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[W]hen I read the personal accounts which 
the student leaders [of the 1989 Beijing 
student movement] gave in my interviews 
and in published memoirs, I found many of 
them in the form “I walked down the road 
and saw X (or, I woke up in the morning and 
thought of Y), and then I decided to do Z.” 
In other words, many of their activities rep-
resented spontaneous and individualistic 
responses to events rather than conscious 
decisions arrived at collectively by their 
organizations. (Zhao 2001:147)
In the meetings prior to January 25th [2011], 
some activists did pose the question . . . “So 
when we reach Tahrir, what are we going to 
do?” And I think everybody was like, well, 
when we reach Tahrir, we’ll see. There was 
no plan. I mean, there was a plan . . . like, 
you know, “we’re going to meet at some 
point . . .” but [the notion that] we’ll be at 
Tahrir, we’ll have a plan, there will be, you 
know, security committees . . . —it’s all 
crap. I mean, this is all spontaneous and it 
evolved . . . [over] time. (Hossam El-
Hamalawy, quoted in Al Jazeera English 
2012)
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Abstract
This article reexamines spontaneity as an important, albeit neglected, mechanism in collective 
action dynamics, and elaborates on its operation and effects in protest events and social 
movements. We do not presume that spontaneity is routinely at play in all collective actions. 
Rather, based on our grounded analysis of historical and ethnographic data, we contend 
that spontaneity is triggered by certain conditions: nonhierarchical organization; uncertain/
ambiguous moments and events; behavioral/emotional priming; and certain ecological/
spatial factors. We conclude by elaborating why the activation of spontaneous actions matters 
in shaping the course and character of protest events and movements, and we suggest that 
spontaneity be resuscitated in the study of collective action and everyday life more generally.
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These statements are observations of two 
of the most widely observed collective action 
events in the past 50 years. In the first state-
ment, sociologist Dingxin Zhao refers to 
spontaneity as a dynamic element in the Bei-
jing Spring student protests of 1989; in the 
second, activist Hossam El-Hamalawy 
emphasizes the role of spontaneity in the 
2011 Egyptian revolution. But aside from a 
few close-to-the ground observations of col-
lective protest such as these, spontaneity is 
rarely mentioned in recent literature on social 
movements and protest. In this article, we 
reexamine the dynamic of spontaneity, argu-
ing that it is often an important mechanism in 
the dynamics of collective action. Our objec-
tive is to bring spontaneity back into the 
analysis of protest dynamics and social 
movements by elaborating a set of conditions 
that specify when spontaneity is most likely 
to be activated in the course of these phe-
nomena and by showing why its activation 
matters.
We begin with a conceptualization of 
spontaneity rooted in the intersection of sym-
bolic interactionism and cognitive psychol-
ogy; we then turn to a critical examination of 
the literature on social movements and pro-
test to discern how spontaneity has been 
treated. After demonstrating the neglect and 
misconceptualization of spontaneity in rela-
tion to protest, we argue for its resurrection, 
contending that its inclusion in the concep-
tual and theoretical arsenal of scholars of 
social movements and protest will contribute 
to a more thorough understanding of the 
dynamics of these collective phenomena. We 
do not presume that spontaneity is routinely 
at play in the course of such events; rather, 
we contend that spontaneity is triggered by 
certain conditions. Based on a grounded 
analysis of ethnographic and historical obser-
vations, we specify a set of conditions that 
make the occurrence of spontaneous actions 
more likely, and we conclude by elaborating 
how spontaneity matters in shaping the 
course and character of protest events and 
movements.
SPonTAneiTy AnD iTS 
MiSConCePTuAlizATion 
AnD MiSTheorizATion
Various synonyms for spontaneity include 
adlibbing, improvisation, winging it, extem-
poraneous, impromptu, off the cuff, off the 
top of one’s head, and unplanned. Although 
most of these terms are associated with 
speaking, debating, lecturing, and perform-
ing, they all reference unplanned actions or 
events, in the sense that these actions or 
events are not thought through in a delibera-
tive fashion in advance of their occurrence. 
This is not to say that spontaneous actions or 
events are random and unpredictable, but 
rather that they are not premeditated or part of 
a formalized system of action.1 Nor is it to say 
that spontaneous actions, whether verbal or 
nonverbal, do not have calls for specific lines 
of action embedded within them. To yell out 
“run!” on the scent of smoke is a call to action 
and may thus be construed as strategic in the 
means/end sense. But such sudden and star-
tling actions are spontaneous inasmuch as 
they were not planned in advance of the 
stimulus event. Thus, spontaneity may be best 
understood as a cover term for events, hap-
penings, and lines of action, both verbal and 
nonverbal, which were not planned, intended, 
prearranged, or organized in advance of their 
occurrence.
Drawing on symbolic interactionism and 
cognitive psychology, we contend that con-
ceptualizing spontaneous actions in this way 
does not imply a lack of cognition or rational-
ity. Rather, if action is understood in terms of 
Mead’s (1938) conception of an act, which 
consists of four elements—impulse, percep-
tion, manipulation, and culmination—we 
contend that spontaneous action can be char-
acterized accordingly. The difference between 
prior deliberation and the cognitive process 
associated with spontaneous action is that the 
latter is compressed in time. However, this 
does not imply a cognitive “short-circuiting” 
of the kind Smelser (1962:82) conjectured in 
his theory of collective behavior. Rather, the 
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process is more akin to Simon’s (1957) notion 
of “bounded rationality,” with its emphasis on 
“satisficing” rather than “optimizing” in the 
face of limited information and time, and Kah-
neman’s (2011) distinction between fast and 
slow thinking, with spontaneous decision-
making being a case of fast thinking.2 Finally, 
we want to emphasize that spontaneous 
actions may occur individually or collectively, 
and sometimes they may be interconnected, as 
when a spontaneous individual action stimu-
lates a spontaneous collective action. In either 
case, we are interested primarily in spontane-
ous actions that alter the course and character 
of the encompassing collectivity in ways that 
were not previously planned.
Our orienting contention is that some col-
lective actions occurring within the context of 
protests and movements are spontaneous and 
consequential for the larger collective actions 
in which they are embedded, and sometimes 
also for subsequent collective actions. If so, 
understanding the relationship between spon-
taneity and protest events is fundamental to 
understanding protest events’ character and 
dynamics more generally. However, one will 
find little on spontaneity that is analytically 
instructive in the literature on protest and 
social movements since the mid-1970s. When 
there has been analytic reference to spontane-
ity, it is typically misplaced temporally in the 
life course of protest events, or misconstrued 
in the dynamics of those events and their 
sponsoring movements. Before turning to the 
evidentiary bases for incorporating spontane-
ity into our analyses of protests and move-
ments, we assess the analytic treatment of 
spontaneity and its general neglect in recent 
theorization and research.
Treatment of Spontaneity in 
Collective Behavior and Protest Event 
Analyses
The concept of spontaneity has had a pendulum-
like career in the study of collective action 
and social movements. Reference to the con-
cept dates back to at least the Marxist debates 
regarding the origins of class consciousness 
in the late-nineteenth century. One side of the 
debate, rooted in the revolutionary prognosti-
cations of the Manifesto of the Communist 
Party (Marx and Engels 1948), emphasized 
the spontaneous emergence of class con-
sciousness. The other side, anchored in Len-
in’s (1969) championing of the revolutionary 
Social-Democratic party, emphasized the 
external organizational base for the develop-
ment of revolutionary class consciousness. 
However, the less organizationally focused 
“collective behavior perspective,” ranging 
from LeBon (1897) through Blumer ([1939] 
1972), embraced the concept of spontaneity 
as a fundamental mechanism in collective 
action dynamics. According to Blumer 
([1939] 1972:68), collective behavior in gen-
eral, and its elementary forms more specifi-
cally, constituted behavior that “arises 
spontaneously and is not due to pre- 
established understandings or traditions.” For 
Blumer, behavioral coordination occurred 
through contagion via the coordinating mech-
anism of “circular interaction” in contrast to 
“interpretive interaction.” Blumer’s thesis, as 
well as the contagion argument in general, 
were subsequently criticized (McPhail 1991; 
Turner and Killian 1987) and expunged from 
the collective action/social movement con-
ceptual toolkit.
Turner and Killian (1987:58), however, 
viewed spontaneity as “an essential element . . . 
in collective behavior” and made it a corner-
stone dynamic of their emergent norm thesis. In 
the third edition of their text Collective Behav-
ior (1987), Turner and Killian refer to protests 
and other collective phenomena, such as public 
opinion, as spontaneous. The fate of Turner and 
Killian’s emergent norm thesis has not been 
quite as dire as LeBon’s and Blumer’s conta-
gion thesis, but it has been similarly criticized 
(McPhail 1991) and has largely fallen out of 
use. This is due, in part, to the changing context 
of contentious gatherings associated with 
changes in protest policing.
Research on protest policing in western 
democracies reveals that practices have his-
torically clustered into two styles: “‘hard’ 
police styles, characterized by an escalated 
 by guest on October 25, 2014asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
4  American Sociological Review 
use of force in order to implement law and 
order (with low respect for demonstrators’ 
rights) versus ‘soft’ police styles, where nego-
tiations (and protest rights) prevail” (della 
Porta and Fillieule 2004:219). The escalated 
use of force to control and disperse protesters 
was particularly prominent during the 1960s 
and the first half of the 1970s. The “softer” 
approach, involving negotiations between 
police and protesters to establish ground rules 
in advance of demonstrations, began to pre-
vail in the 1980s.3 Since then, the general 
trend in the United States and Europe has 
been toward development of public order 
management systems (POMS), in which pro-
test demonstrations become increasingly 
standardized, thus reducing the likelihood of 
newsworthy tactical innovations and sponta-
neous actions.4 The diffusion of POMS, 
wherein demonstrations are negotiated and 
scripted temporally, locationally, and behav-
iorally prior to their occurrence, may obviate 
the likelihood of emergent norms. However, 
it does not preclude the possibility of sponta-
neous action under certain conditions, which 
we identify and illustrate.
The relevance of spontaneity to social 
movements more generally has also been dis-
puted. The debate has not been about whether 
spontaneity is sometimes at play in the opera-
tion of social movements, but about its locus 
in a movement’s career. For example, Blumer 
([1939] 1972) and Turner and Killian (1972) 
argued that spontaneity is more likely early in 
a movement’s career than as movements 
develop and become more organized. How-
ever, Turner and Killian (1987:294) later 
moved beyond Blumer and the earlier collec-
tive behavior literature by noting the role of 
organization and calling attention to “the 
interplay between spontaneity and organiza-
tion.” This suggested focus on the “interplay” 
was ignored in subsequent commentary, how-
ever, as Marx and McAdam (1994:73) 
restated Blumer’s initial claim even more 
strongly: “It is at the outset that social move-
ments bear their closest relationship to other 
forms of collective behavior. To the extent 
that social movements can ever be described 
as spontaneous or emergent, it is during this 
period.”
This line of argumentation strikes us as 
conceptually and empirically misguided, in 
that it misapprehends and erroneously concre-
tizes the place and function of spontaneity, 
treating it as a stage rather than as a dynamic 
element within the collective action process. 
But these issues have become largely irrele-
vant to scholarship on social movements since 
the ascendance of the resource mobilization 
and political process/opportunity perspectives, 
as spontaneity is rarely mentioned, a few 
exceptions notwithstanding (Auyero 2003; 
Fantasia 1988; Polletta 1998; Zhao 2001).
We contend that a central reason why 
spontaneity has been ignored lies in the ten-
dency for scholars to think analytically about 
social movement dynamics in terms of binary 
oppositions. Binary juxtapositions are preva-
lent in movement theorizing and analysis, just 
as they are in much of sociological analysis 
(Zerubavel 1996). Some of the more common 
oppositions include rationality versus irra-
tionality and emotion; solidarity versus break-
down; disorganization versus organization; 
and spontaneity versus organization. One 
problem with such oppositions is that they 
often become cognitively encoded, such that 
both our gaze—that is, what we look at and 
see—and how we think about what we see 
become one-sided and inflexible. We find a 
clear history of this encoded binary with 
respect to spontaneity versus organization 
that dates back to the Marxist debates, runs 
through much of the theorization associated 
with the subsequent collective behavior per-
spective, and culminates most recently with 
the dominance of the resource mobilization 
and political process/opportunity perspec-
tives. In each period, spontaneity and organi-
zation were seen as essentially antithetical: 
the organized, revolutionary party trumped 
spontaneity following Lenin (1969); sponta-
neity trumped organization during the collec-
tive behavior era; and organizational and 
political contextual considerations relegated 
spontaneity to the historical dustbin during 
the current contentious politics era. The 
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neglect of spontaneity in recent compendiums 
on social movements provides further evi-
dence of this cycle.5
However, dominant perspectives skewed 
toward one end of a binary continuum often 
invite unsettling questions or alternative 
points of view. For example, writing from 
prison between 1929 and 1935, Gramsci 
(1971:198–99) asked a fundamental theoreti-
cal question: “can modern theory be in oppo-
sition to the ‘spontaneous’ feelings of the 
masses?” By such feelings he meant those 
that exist in the absence of “any systematic 
educational activity on the part of an already 
conscious leading group.” He answered that 
the difference between the two is a “differ-
ence of degree, not one of quality” and noted 
that “reality produces a wealth of the most 
bizarre combinations,” arguing that “[i]t is up 
to the theoretician to unravel these,” and that 
“[i]t is not reality which should be expected 
to conform to the abstract schema” (Gramsci 
1971:159–200). Turner and Killian (1987:294) 
made a similar observation when they alluded 
to the “interplay between spontaneity and 
organization.” In the U.S. civil rights move-
ment, for example, McAdam (1982), Morris 
(1984), and others firmly established the cen-
trality of preexisting organizational structures 
in facilitating mobilization. Yet Killian’s 
(1984:772, 780) analysis of the 1956 Talla-
hassee boycott noted the interplay of sponta-
neity and organization:
The precipitating incident was the conse-
quence of what was clearly a spontaneous 
action by two students with no record of 
activism and no organizational connections 
outside Florida A & M University . . . [but] 
the importance of pre-existing structures—
both organizations and networks—is ines-
capably evident.
We agree with the observation regarding 
the interplay between organization and spon-
taneity, arguing that spontaneity and organiza-
tion are neither dichotomous nor oppositional, 
but are instead often highly interactive.6 
Drawing on these insights, we advance the 
elements of a theory of spontaneity in relation 
to protests and social movements, arguing that 
consequential spontaneity arises only under 
certain specifiable conditions.
DATA SourCeS AnD 
ProCeDureS
The conditions we identify as associated with 
the occurrence of spontaneous collective 
action in the context of protest events and 
movements, as well as the consequences of 
these spontaneous occurrences, are derived 
empirically from three types of qualitative 
sources. One source consists of our ethno-
graphic observations of protest demonstra-
tions that we conducted independently at 
different points in our respective research 
careers. A second data source includes on-
the-ground observations by participants in 
protest demonstrations. The third source con-
sists of previously published materials by 
social scientists, historians, and government 
commissions investigating instances of pro-
test events and demonstrations. The sources 
for all materials used to illustrate and ground 
the underlying conditions are indicated when 
the materials are introduced.
Our inquiry and analyses proceed induc-
tively in a manner consistent with grounded 
theory methodology (Charmaz 2006; Strauss 
and Corbin 1990). The essence of this meth-
odology is that it facilitates the derivation of 
theoretical principles and hypotheses from 
the phenomena studied; hence the appellation 
inductively derived or grounded theory. Pro-
ceeding in this fashion is especially appropri-
ate when there is little relevant theorization, 
hypothesis generation, or hypothesis testing 
regarding the phenomenon of interest. Such is 
the case, as already noted, with respect to 
spontaneity in relation to protest events and 
movements. Curiosity about the role of spon-
taneity in relation to these phenomena grew 
out of our own ethnographic observations 
rather than through analytic discourses on the 
topic. It was after our independent observa-
tions of what we took to be spontaneous col-
lective actions, and our joint discussions of 
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them, that we began to consider the phenom-
enon as a topic for analytic interrogation and 
to case the literature for empirical accounts of 
other instances of its occurrence in the con-
text of collection action.
This process of “casing” the literature 
involved several steps. First, we searched for 
rich, on-the-ground, descriptive accounts of 
protest-related collective action events that 
included reference to what we conceptualized 
as spontaneous actions. This generated a rela-
tively small number of historical cases, not 
only because of the rarity of detailed ethno-
graphic accounts of protest events, but also 
because of the previously mentioned neglect of 
spontaneity by the dominant collective action/
social movement perspectives. Additionally, 
most protest event research over the past 25 
years has not been well-suited for examining 
on-the-ground dynamic elements such as spon-
taneity. This research has been based largely 
on interviews with protest participants to 
account for their participation or analysis of 
media accounts, principally newspapers, of 
protest events. Although protest event research 
has become a dominant method for studying 
protests and movements and has advanced 
understanding of aspects of these phenomena 
(Soule 2013), it is limited in large part by the 
character of the media data analyzed.
These limiting factors associated with pro-
test event research notwithstanding, we looked 
to studies of now well-chronicled protests 
(e.g., Ireland’s Bloody Sunday, Kent State, 
and Tiananmen Square) compiled by ethno-
graphic or qualitative/historical researchers 
and investigatory reports that provide detailed, 
first-hand accounts of the events examined. 
We identified a number of such studies and 
then examined them for conditions that 
appeared to precipitate or be associated with 
the occurrence of spontaneous actions. Con-
sistent with the constant comparative charac-
ter of grounded theory methodology and its 
associated principle of theoretical sampling, 
which involves searching for and zeroing in 
on data that elaborate and refine the categories 
or conditions associated with the emergent 
theory, we coded and then compared each 
identified condition with the subsequent cases 
investigated. In this way, we proceeded to 
identify a set of conditions associated in a 
precipitating fashion with the occurrence of 
spontaneous collective actions.
In keeping with the strategy of theoretical 
sampling, one might proceed until no new 
category properties or conditions emerge, 
which, in principle, could be indefinitely. But 
eschewing methodological idealism for meth-
odological pragmatism, we not only identi-
fied spontaneity as a sometimes important 
element of collective action dynamics, but we 
also identified and elaborated a set of associ-
ated triggering conditions. Moreover, we find 
that Katz’s (2001:331) contention with respect 
to the overlapping strategy of analytic induc-
tion also applies to the grounded theory 
approach to which we adhered: “There is no 
methodological value in piling up data of a 
sort already determined to be consistent with” 
the revised or emerging theory.
ConDiTionS Triggering 
SPonTAneouS ColleCTive 
ACTion
Our orienting proposition is that spontaneity 
sometimes figures prominently in the dynam-
ics of social movement demonstrations and 
protest events. We do not argue that spontane-
ity is routinely or randomly distributed across 
collective action events. Rather, we contend 
that the occurrence of spontaneous collective 
actions is most likely under specifiable condi-
tions. In identifying and elaborating these 
conditions, we do not presume they are mutu-
ally exclusive or exhaustive. As we argue and 
illustrate, they may interact and combine. 
Conditions other than those we identify may 
also occasion the occurrence of spontaneous 
collective actions. Accordingly, this analysis is 
a first step, albeit a major one, in development 
of an empirically grounded theory of spontane-
ity within the context of social movements and 
their associated collective action events.
With these caveats in mind, we turn to an 
elaboration of four conditions we identified 
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as precipitants of spontaneous collective 
actions: the absence of hierarchical organiza-
tion; uncertain/ambiguous moments and 
events with a number of associated sub- 
conditions; behavioral/emotional priming and 
framing; and ecological/spatial contexts and 
constraints.
Condition 1: Nonhierarchical 
Movements
Much has been made in the past 30-plus years 
about the organizational dimensions of social 
movements, including formal, professional, 
and hierarchical leadership (e.g., Andrews 
and Edwards 2004; Davis et al. 2005; McCar-
thy and Zald 1977). Yet, social movements 
are also populated by “varied and malleable 
organizational forms” (Clemens and Minkoff 
2004:156), including movements character-
ized by anti-hierarchical, participatory, and 
deliberative democratic styles (Doerr 2013; 
Polletta 2002; Rothschild and Whitt 1986). 
These collectivities are wary of formal lead-
ership and strive to treat participants as rela-
tively equal contributors rather than as the 
“rank and file.” We propose that nonhierar-
chical movements are more likely to produce 
spontaneous collective actions, because their 
cultures valorize openness, innovation, and 
experimental forms of collective action (Pol-
letta 2002). As we will discuss, this does not 
mean hierarchical movements do not exhibit 
spontaneity, or that the rank and file do not 
sometimes act spontaneously (Fantasia 1988). 
This is also not to say that nonhierarchical 
movements are defined by spontaneity, as 
they are also characterized by routinized pro-
cedures and activities (Glass 2010). However, 
because nonhierarchical movements value 
and often rely on impromptu contributions by 
participants, we propose that these move-
ments are more likely to produce unplanned 
actions and dynamics.
Concrete illustration of how nonhierarchi-
cal movements produce spontaneity during 
protest events is provided by grounded obser-
vations by the second author of Syrian-American 
demonstrations in 2011 and 2012 in the greater 
Los Angeles region, including one protest con-
ducted jointly with activists in the Occupy 
L.A. movement, and participant accounts of 
Occupy D.C. After the onset of anti-regime 
protests in Syria and corresponding regime 
crackdowns in 2011, Syrian-American activ-
ists protested at Russian and Chinese embas-
sies, held demonstrations and fundraisers, and 
put on “flash mobs,” in which participants 
froze in scenes reenacting the regime’s vio-
lence. These events were characterized by their 
nonhierarchical structure, being initiated pri-
marily through informal calls to action on 
Facebook and by word of mouth, and partici-
pants frequently initiated unrehearsed actions 
over the course of the events. Although some 
individuals did volunteer to take on greater 
responsibilities, thus making them de facto 
leaders, impromptu coordination attempts by 
these participants were often overridden by 
other participants. For example, pleas for 
chants to be spoken in English were frequently 
overtaken by jubilant singing in Arabic; groups 
of protesters waved their shoes at pro-Assad 
counter-protesters despite the disapproval of 
de facto leaders; street-corner rallies trans-
formed into marches without any stated pur-
pose or preplanned timing; and chants were 
debated and modified throughout the demon-
strations. At a protest at the L.A. Chinese Con-
sulate, for example, a participant with a 
bullhorn yelled out, “down, down with China!” 
He was then interrupted by a debate; after 
negotiations, the collectivity modified the 
chant to “shame, shame on China’s politics!”
Ethnographic observation of a joint 
Occupy L.A. and Syrian-American protest 
held at Los Angeles’ City Hall in December 
2011 further illustrates the importance of 
spontaneous, creative actions in shaping the 
character of nonhierarchical protest events. 
First, after a series of improvised speeches 
about Syria at the onset of the gathering, the 
group agreed on a demonstration route and 
proceeded to march around City Hall. As the 
gathering paused at an intersection, a partici-
pant pointed to the L.A. Sister Cities monu-
ment and suggested we declare Homs, a 
Syrian city facing regime bombardment, to be 
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a sister city. After this decision was voted on 
and approved by the group, several protesters 
suggested that a makeshift sign be attached to 
the monument itself. After participants scat-
tered to assemble the necessary supplies, a 
discussion ensued about which other Syrian 
cities should be commemorated. In response 
to a chorus of replies, the sign’s author 
announced they would include Homs, Hama, 
and Dar‘aa; participants huddled at the base 
of the monument around the sign-writer and 
agreed that the city names should be in Arabic 
on one side and English on other. Once the 
sign was written, a young woman climbed the 
signpost and secured the sign to the loud 
applause and cheers of the group. At this 
point, participants initiated a series of impro-
vised speeches dedicating the monument in 
English and Arabic. The mood of the protest 
was invigorated by the success of the sym-
bolic dedication and the emotional solidarity 
it produced between Syrians and Occupiers, 
some of whom cried and thanked each other.
As the march continued, intermittently inter-
rupted by additional improvised speeches, the 
protesters at the head of the march led the 
group back to the City Hall steps, where another 
group of demonstrators were holding banners 
describing the Chinese government’s human 
rights abuses in Tibet. Upon approaching this 
group, the Syrian–Occupy demonstrators spon-
taneously erupted in exuberant chants of “Free 
Tibet!” and then, without instruction, moved to 
stand beside the pro-Tibet protesters on the 
steps. One of the de facto leaders of the Syrian 
group and several spokespersons for the Tibetan 
group initiated a series of unplanned speeches 
emphasizing the common struggle facing both 
groups against brutal dictatorships, adapting 
their messages on the fly to address the newly 
formed coalition. One of the pro-Tibet spokes-
persons announced that after marching to the 
Chinese Consulate, their group would demand 
that the government stop supporting the Assad 
regime, which produced loud cheers from the 
Syrian–Occupy protesters.
These unplanned actions produced numer-
ous symbolic dedications, strengthened 
within-movement solidarities, and generated 
an incidental coalition opposed to Chinese 
policy. Rather than perceived as digressions 
from a preordained plan, such spontaneous 
detours were celebrated by the group as invig-
orating the spirit of the event. We suspect that 
analyses of the 2011 Occupy movements, for 
example, will likely find that the valorization 
of creative, spontaneous initiatives between 
equals—only loosely channeled by participant-
moderators and emergent subgroups— 
frequently produced unplanned collective 
actions that reinforced deliberative demo-
cratic processes and shaped participants’ daily 
experiences. As a founding member of the 
Occupy D.C. movement reported in an inter-
view,7 the movement began with just a hand-
ful of individuals excited about the happenings 
in New York’s Occupy Wall Street, without 
the planning or involvement of Washington’s 
known leftist community, whose members 
were “shocked” that the movement had 
formed without their resources or expertise. 
This founding member attested that partici-
pants volunteered in various capacities to 
distribute food, administer medical attention, 
and other such activities because “you wanted 
to do it. Nobody told you to do it.” Yet, the 
fact that spontaneous actions, when condoned 
by group consensus, are regarded as a virtue 
within and across such movements has 
received only sparse analytic attention. In 
light of these observations, we propose that 
spontaneity is more likely to be found within 
nonhierarchical movements, because it is an 
integral part of their culture and operation.
Condition 2: Ambiguous Moments 
and Events
A central element in symbolic interactionist 
theorization about collective behavior/action 
is the concept of ambiguity. In his study of 
rumor, Shibutani (1966:23) asserted that the 
“basic unit of analysis” is “the ambiguous 
situation, and the central problem is to ascer-
tain how working orientations toward it 
develop.” Drawing on Shibutani in their 
approach to collective behavior and social 
movements, Turner and Killian (1987:58) 
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contend that when “faced with ambiguity, the 
actors must engage in the construction of a 
new definition of the situation,” which they 
designate as the “emergent norm.” However, 
this is an overstatement, particularly from the 
standpoint of continental philosophies such as 
phenomenology and existentialism, for which 
ambiguity is a frequent companion of every-
day life at both the individual and collective 
levels but does not necessarily give rise to 
unpredictable, spontaneous actions. Smelser 
(1962:86–88) also noted that what he calls 
“structured ambiguity” is a routine feature of 
some aspects of social life. Yet, as Shibutani 
and Turner and Killian surmised, there is 
often a causal relationship between ambiguity 
and spontaneous collective action. The prob-
lem is that neither they nor others have 
clearly identified the conditions likely to link 
ambiguity and spontaneous collective actions. 
To this end, we identified three such causal 
sub-conditions: script breakdown, script dis-
solution, and non-scripted square-offs.
Script breakdown or disruption. As 
noted earlier, protest policing strategies have 
evolved and congealed into public order man-
agements systems (POMS) (McCarthy and 
McPhail 1998). The general objective of 
these new procedures is to reduce the pros-
pect of disorder and violence by standardiz-
ing policing practices in ways that control and 
manage protesters’ access to and behavior in 
public spaces. POMS exhibit a number of 
“important principles in their operations,” 
including “negotiation between affected par-
ties” (McCarthy and McPhail 1998:91), such 
as social control agents and representatives of 
the movement organization sponsoring the 
event. The outcome of these negotiations is 
the development of what we call a negotiated 
script, which constitutes the ground rules 
regarding the timing, location, and behavioral 
repertories of the event. While there is no 
question that these negotiated scripts have 
standardized, and even conventionalized, 
much protest, they are often fragile and tenu-
ous. This is due in no small part to the fact 
that pre-event negotiations seldom include all 
sets of actors that populate the event field, 
which may include bystanders, counter- 
protesters, and the media in addition to the main 
protesters and control agents. The presence of 
these various actors can affect the flow and 
character of a protest event in unforeseen 
ways independent of the negotiated script. 
Moreover, there is no guarantee that protest-
ers and control agents will behave as scripted, 
as evidenced in various studies of protest 
policing and “riots”8 (Stark 1972; Wadding-
ton 1991; Walker 1969). Consequently, nego-
tiated scripts are vulnerable to disruption or 
violation by various sets of actors. In some 
instances, the disruption or violation may be 
intentional and thus covertly scripted by some 
actors, as in the case of agent provocateurs 
(Marx 2013); in other instances, the disrup-
tion may be unplanned. In either case, we 
argue that script disruptions or breakdowns 
are likely to produce spontaneous adjust-
ments and lines of action.
To illustrate, we turn first to ethnographic 
observations conducted in 1983 in Austin, 
Texas.9 The event was a Ku Klux Klan march 
through downtown Austin to the state capitol 
grounds, around the capitol, and back to the 
Klan staging area. Several hundred Klan 
marchers, festooned in their traditional garb, 
were protected on all sides by phalanxes of 
city and capitol police who wore riot helmets 
and carried shields to protect themselves and 
the Klan from the stones and lunch bags of 
dog feces being thrown their way. The march 
was organized beforehand in accordance with 
the POMS in place. But, as suggested earlier, 
events do not always proceed as scripted; 
rather, sudden, unanticipated adjustments are 
likely to occur in response to script disrup-
tions. As the parade of marching Klansmen, 
cordoned off by the police on each side and to 
the front and rear, approached the capitol 
grounds, spectators and counter-protesters 
fell in behind the parading entourage, making 
it increasingly difficult for the control agents 
to maintain separation among the different 
and conflicting elements of the gathering. As 
the head of the Klansmen parade arrived at a 
Y in the road just before reaching the capital 
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building, a throng of counter-protesters 
blocked the path marchers were scripted to 
take. This script disruption produced confu-
sion as to what to do next, even by the police. 
At that moment, some counter-protesters 
broke through the police line, the Klan started 
running, and the police drew their clubs. Con-
fusion and pandemonium broke loose for 
several minutes until the police regained con-
trol of the situation by surrounding the Klan, 
sealing them from the counter-protesters, and 
marching them back to the initial staging 
area, which was a parking lot where the 
Klansmen’s cars were parked. Not only did 
this sudden, unscripted turn of events cut 
short the Klan demonstration, but it also pre-
cipitated a non-scripted square-off between a 
group of counter-protesters and the fleeing 
Klansmen upon their return to the staging 
area. Additionally, it affected how the capitol 
and city police subsequently organized them-
selves and scripted another Klan march the 
following year.
Northern Ireland’s infamous “Bloody Sun-
day” of January 30, 1972, further illustrates 
script breakdown. During this event in Derry, 
13 demonstrators were killed and about as 
many injured by the British army during a 
march organized by the Northern Ireland Civil 
Rights Association (NICRA) and the Derry 
Civil Rights Association against internment 
without charge.10 Authorities and organizers 
had negotiated a demonstration route before 
the day of the event. However, authorities 
changed the script, erecting Barrier 14 to pre-
vent protesters from reaching the previously 
agreed on destination of Guildhall Square 
(Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry [BSI] 
2010, v. 1:49–50). In response, the organizers 
planned for the march to culminate at Free 
Derry Corner, intending for participants to fol-
low a lorry in a “disciplined fashion” to the 
new end point (BSI 2010, v. 2:72). However, 
only some of the stewards were informed 
about the change, no public announcement 
about the switch was made, and some march-
ers walked in front of, rather than behind, the 
lorry (BSI 2010, v. 2:81–83). When the march 
reached the intersection of William 
and Rossville Streets, organizers intended for 
participants to turn right on Rossville toward 
Free Derry Corner. However, both those who 
came to the event “intent” on confronting 
authorities at some unspecified point in the 
march and those who did not intend to engage 
in disruptive conduct proceeded down Wil-
liam Street in the direction of Guildhall (BSI 
2010, v. 2:89). Upon approaching Barrier 14, 
some participants threw stones at the security 
agents, after which several stewards attempted 
to get in front and prevent the unruly partici-
pants from confronting the soldiers. An 
announcement was made from the lorry for 
participants to continue to Free Derry Corner, 
but the street became “blocked” with people at 
the intersection of William and Rossville 
Streets, which pushed the demonstrators up 
against Barrier 14 (BSI 2010, v. 2:93): “There 
was thus at this stage very considerable confu-
sion and a loss of control of the march.” The 
stewards could not contain the swell of par-
ticipants; soldiers used a water cannon and CS 
gas (a type of tear gas), which scattered par-
ticipants into nearby streets and produced 
subsequent spontaneous confrontations at 
other nearby barriers. As we discuss further in 
Condition 4, the confusion caused by script 
breakdown significantly contributed to the 
unplanned use of lethal force by military 
forces against demonstrators.
Script dissolution. We have noted how 
changes in protest policing have altered 
aspects of the dynamics of collective action 
events, such that preplanned, scripted events 
have rendered the idea of emergent norms as 
generally irrelevant. Yet, certain moments in 
the career of a protest event or demonstration 
exhibit considerable ambiguity about what to 
do next. In some cases, this is the outcome of 
script disruption, as shown earlier; in other 
cases, it may be a consequence of script dis-
solution. That is, the event has ended and 
there is no additional script for subsequent 
action. In such cases, we hypothesize there 
will be increased probability of spontaneous 
collective action, particularly in the case of 
contestation over emotionally charged issues.
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Illustrative evidence is provided by the 
first author’s participant observations of a 
noon-time rally at the University of Akron in 
Ohio to protest and dialogue about the May 
4, 1970, Kent State University campus shoot-
ing, in which 13 students were shot, four 
fatally, by Ohio National Guardsmen. The 
University of Akron is only a few miles from 
Kent State University. As with students at 
most universities at that time, many students 
at the University of Akron were angry about 
what had transpired at Kent State and were 
clamoring for the opportunity to discuss the 
shooting, as well as President Nixon’s earlier 
announcement of the invasion of Cambodia, 
which an estimated 500 Kent State students 
were protesting when the shootings occurred. 
At the University of Akron and elsewhere, a 
“free speech area” was established to accom-
modate student demands for dialogue about 
the events. The following describes the first 
author’s abbreviated observations of and 
experience with script dissolution and the 
associated ambiguity at one of these 
gatherings:
A few days after the Kent shootings, around 
150 students assembled at the free speech 
area at noon to listen to a couple of speak-
ers. I attended that rally with several friends. 
Following the last speech, there was a preg-
nant pause, as students seemed to be waiting 
for another speaker or directions as to what 
to do next. But no one stepped up. So I 
whispered to one of my friends, as we stood 
at the back of the gathering, “watch this.” 
And then I blurted out at the top of my 
lungs: “Strike! Strike! Shut it down!” 
Within seconds that keynote to strike was 
repeated among other crowd members, and 
then the entire gathering appeared to be 
chanting the slogan in unison. Within a min-
ute or two most of the gathering was march-
ing to the campus’s main administration 
building to “shut it down.” These actions 
were spontaneous by both me and the gath-
ering as a whole. I had not planned to blurt 
out the “Strike! Strike! Shut it down!” slo-
gan; nor was there a prearranged plan by the 
participants to march to the administration 
building to shut it down.
One could argue there was a script for such 
action, as calls to shut down universities were 
occurring around the country. But both the 
keynote and the march from the free speech 
area to the administration building were 
emergent, spontaneous actions.
It is reasonable to wonder why such spon-
taneous actions do not occur at the end of all 
collective action events. We suspect the 
answer is that most events have a negotiated 
or planned ending to them, which lessens the 
prospect of ambiguity. This was not the case 
with the above incident, however, as the last 
speaker gave no indication that the rally was 
over and the gathering should disperse. More-
over, the designated time-span for the rally 
had not yet been exhausted. Thus, we contend 
that spontaneous collective action is more 
likely when there is ambiguity about whether 
an event has officially ended and the temporal 
window is still open.
Non-scripted square-offs. Spontaneous 
collective actions may occur in the aftermath 
of a completed rally or demonstration, as in 
the case of the previously described 1983 Ku 
Klux Klan march in Austin. By the time 
police had escorted the marching Klansmen 
back to the assembly area, a local activist and 
several adherents had already congregated 
there. This small group of counter-protesters 
was not involved in the initial, pre-event 
negotiations and caught the police and Klans-
men by surprise. After a moment of ambigu-
ity, during which counter-protesters heckled 
the Klan and police, a violent confrontation 
erupted spontaneously between the counter-
protesters and half-a-dozen police officers.
We conceptualize such confrontational 
encounters as non-scripted square-offs 
because they typically are not planned before-
hand and thus arise spontaneously. It is 
important to note that while such square-offs 
are sometimes themselves spontaneous 
actions, they may also generate subsequent 
spontaneity within protest events, either 
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altering an event’s character or extending it 
beyond its initial planned dissolution. We 
observed a number of such square-offs 
between two or more individuals or groups 
occurring with script dissolution or the dis-
persion of gatherings at political rallies. Most 
square-offs probably have little consequence 
beyond the participants involved, but some 
can have important effects, as did the non-
scripted violent skirmish between the Klan 
counter-demonstrators and the police trying 
to protect the Klansmen. This event, coupled 
with the larger march, was the basis for an 
investigation by Austin’s Human Relations 
Committee and a report specifying recom-
mendations for managing future “controver-
sial parades.”
Ambiguous moments leading to non-
scripted square-offs can also provide protest-
ers with opportunities, as one Tahrir Square 
observer noted, “to discover that they’ve got 
some power they didn’t think they had” (Sch-
neider 2011). The first day marking the 2011 
Egyptian revolution, for example, began as 
another day of protest, rather than one of 
revolution. As activist Hossam El-Hamalawy 
reported to Al Jazeera English, “I thought Jan. 
[sic] 25 was going to be just another demon-
stration with a couple hundred people and a 
couple thousand central security forces, and 
that was the end of that.”11 Another partici-
pant, Mona Seif, observed that the numbers 
of demonstrators heading toward Tahrir 
Square grew within “seconds” to number in 
the thousands. As participants approached the 
square, they confronted the widely feared 
Central Security Forces. These agents linked 
arms to block the protesters, but the demon-
strators broke through; Seif remembered 
“raising our arms and saying ‘peaceful, 
peaceful,’ and there was no resistance because 
we really outnumbered them.” Dozens of 
security forces then began charging toward 
the protesters to dissuade the surge. “Usually 
what happens” in this circumstance, activist 
Gigi Ibrahim attested, “is the protesters . . . 
run away.” However, when protesters on the 
front lines faced this challenge, a moment of 
ambiguity produced a spontaneous and 
pivotal instance of resistance by anti-regime 
demonstrators. As Ibrahim reported,
For a few moments . . . some tens of people 
at the front lines stopped—they kind of 
looked at each other and they started . . . 
attacking. Everybody started running at the 
officers and the officers actually ran away. 
This for me was just mind blowing . . . then 
[the protesters] started putting up barri-
cades, and this was the initial sites of Tahrir 
being born . . .
Here, we can see that the role of spontaneity 
in the Egyptian revolution of 2011 is more 
than a narrative device. The non-scripted 
square-off with security forces on the streets 
of Cairo enabled anti-regime protesters to 
incite an unplanned confrontation with the 
security apparatus and launch the occupation 
of Tahrir Square, which contributed to the 
overthrow of then-president Hosni Mubarak.
The three mechanisms elaborated in Con-
dition 2 help specify the kinds of conditions 
that link ambiguity to spontaneous collective 
action within protest events. However, they 
do not clarify the form spontaneous actions 
may take. To better understand the issue of 
form, we turn to the condition of priming.
Condition 3: Behavioral/Emotional 
Priming and Framing
In considering these instances of spontaneous 
collective action, it is reasonable to wonder 
why the actors took one line of action rather 
than another. For example, in the case of the 
keynoter blurting out “strike, strike, shut it 
down,” why that particular keynote rather 
than another? And why did the students 
march directly to the administration building 
upon hearing the call to strike, strike, shut it 
down? A simple, straightforward answer is 
mimicry. But that implies a kind of mindless 
contagion explanation associated with early 
collective behavior theorizing that has been 
rejected empirically and theoretically (see 
McPhail 1991; Turner and Killian 1987). 
Moreover, to call such collective action 
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mimicry or contagion is to label it rather than 
to explain it. To answer such questions, we 
draw on the social psychological concept of 
priming and its connection to framing.
Priming refers to an increased sensitivity to 
certain stimuli due to prior experiences. It is a 
pre-sensitizing process that increases the prob-
ability of activating a concept, frame, emo-
tion, or line of action based on exposure to an 
earlier, similar stimulus or experience. This 
experiential priming effect was theorized 
some time ago by Mead in The Philosophy of 
the Act (1938). Although Mead (1938:3) did 
not use the word priming, his discussion of the 
impulse stage of the act foreshadowed its 
operation: “there accompanies this attitude 
[by which he meant the reaction to a stimula-
tion] of the response some imagery which is 
taken from past experiences in which the 
responses have been carried out.” Psycholo-
gists have recently affirmed this priming effect 
by showing that words and mental con-
structs—traits, stereotypes, and prejudices—
can elicit behavior without any awareness on 
the part of the individuals so affected (Bargh, 
Chen, and Burrows 1996; Kahneman 2011; 
Steele and Aronson 1995). Such word-based 
priming effects, which are consistent with the 
symbolic interactionist contention that sym-
bols have lines of action embedded within 
them, are explained in part through what cog-
nitive psychologists call associative memory 
and activation. But priming is associated not 
only with concepts and words. Research also 
shows that engaging in various actions can 
prime subsequent actions and emotions in 
ways not anticipated (Kahneman 2011).12
Drawing on such observations, we argue 
that in the face of script breakdowns and dis-
solutions and the associated ambiguities that 
result, the spontaneous lines of action that 
emerge are not random but are dictated, in 
part, by prior priming experiences or cues and 
their relative recency. The inclination to shout 
out “strike, strike, shut it down,” and the asso-
ciated action of marching to the administra-
tion building, can thus be construed as primed 
by an evolving prognostic master frame 
(Snow and Benford 1992) and by the 
protesters having observed or heard about 
these activities on other campuses. The recur-
rent chant of “the people want the fall of the 
regime!” during the Arab Spring is another 
example. Mimicry may be involved, but we 
argue that the priming process makes the 
mimicry more likely.
Research on the “ghetto riots” of the 1960s 
and 1970s across U.S. cities further demon-
strates the relationship between priming and 
spontaneous collective action. These studies 
found that the disorders were often triggered 
by a precipitating incident or event involving 
police action that was perceived as excessive 
and brutal by black residents. As the National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 
(1968:93) concluded in 1967, “almost invari-
ably the incident that ignites disorder arises 
from police action.” But it is also likely that 
during this period, excessive police actions in 
urban black communities far exceeded the 
occurrence of disorders. Although these civil 
disorders were generally spontaneous in the 
sense that they were unplanned, it is clear 
they did not combust spontaneously solely in 
concurrence with excessive police actions. 
Other factors were also necessary, as the riot 
literature makes clear.13 One such factor, we 
submit, was priming. As Feagin and Hahn 
(1973:172) write:
If the precipitating incident represents a 
problem that has been a long-standing or 
increasing source of discontent, local resi-
dents may be more likely to respond actively 
to the rumor and affiliate themselves with 
street crowds. Thus the recruitment of addi-
tional riot participants on the basis of infor-
mation received about the precipitating 
incident is greatly facilitated by pre-existing 
sentiments and experiences.
Further illustration of the importance of 
preexisting sentiments and experiences as 
primers in relation to spontaneous collective 
action is provided by the Rosenstrasse and 
Grosse Hamburger Strasse protests in Berlin 
in 1943. These events involved several hun-
dred gentile women whose Jewish husbands 
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and children had been locked in detention 
centers by the Nazis. The women protested 
against the likelihood of their loved ones 
being deported by staging defiant demonstra-
tions and chanting, “Give our husbands 
back!” According to Stoltzfus’s (2001) his-
torical analysis of the women’s biographies, 
they neither knew each other beforehand nor 
were connected via prior association. There 
was no publicized anti-Nazi protest to mimic, 
yet the women came together despite the 
absence of these standard organizational 
mechanisms or structures. As one participant 
said, “Of course there was an investigation to 
find out whether someone was instigating 
this. But nothing was found. . . . [The protest] 
wasn’t organized but spread by word of 
mouth. It was a spontaneous reaction” (Stoltz-
fus 2001:244).
Stoltzfus’s explanation is that the women 
had already been engaging in nearly a decade 
of individual resistance—what Mansbridge 
(2013) calls “everyday activism”—ignoring 
pressure from the Gestapo to divorce their 
husbands and harassment from neighbors. 
According to our reading of Stoltzfus, the 
women’s ongoing individual-level resistance, 
coupled with their love and loyalty, primed 
them to take spontaneous action during their 
family members’ incarceration.
Drawing on this case, Doherty (2013:1299) 
contends the following:
It is useful to make an analytical distinction 
between two elements of tactical choice: first 
the decision to choose particular forms of 
action, which involves planning and calcula-
tion; and second, the relational moment when 
the tactic is put to action and others react. In 
the Rosenstrasse case, there was no collec-
tive planning, as this action was as close to 
spontaneous as a protest can be, and is thus 
similar to other examples that remind us of 
the importance of decisive but unplanned 
actions taken in the heat of the moment.
Hypothesizing further, we contend that a par-
ticular tactic may be present in a movement’s 
repertoire, but the moment at which that tactic 
is enacted is often unpredictable and 
unplanned. Studies of wildcat strikes in labor 
protests describe this dynamic (Fantasia 
1988; Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 1996). While 
wildcat strikes have long been a part of work-
ers’ repertoires of resistance, the initiation of 
wildcat strikes is not always preplanned or 
subject to the control of union leadership. 
Workers often employ wildcat strikes when 
their moods sour over issues large and small. 
A former member of the United Auto Work-
ers’ Ford Local No. 600 describes this situa-
tion in Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin (1996:123):
The very term wildcat means a spontaneous 
struggle. A spontaneous struggle is some-
thing that takes place at the spur of the 
moment, and [can] take place over the crazi-
est issues that nobody could really anticipate. 
It will explode over anything. . . . I would 
wake up one morning and find out that a 
bunch of guys went out on strike because 
there wasn’t toilet paper in the toilet.
Workers may be primed to initiate a wildcat 
strike by their resentment over poor working 
conditions, anger at their union bosses, or 
stress created by surveillance and the threat of 
violence (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 1996). 
The initiation of a wildcat strike itself, how-
ever, may be spontaneous. And because 
workers may have to convince their fellow 
workers to join unplanned strikes on the fly, 
this can lead to a variety of other improvised 
tactics, such as shouting keynotes, giving 
impromptu speeches, coaxing hesitant co-
workers, and turning preexisting sentiments 
of solidarity into action (Fantasia 1988).
As a final illustration of the connection 
between priming and spontaneous collective 
action, we return to the Kent State shooting. 
The shootings occurred around 12:45 p.m. on 
Monday, May 4, 1970, when 28 National 
Guardsmen fired from the highest point on the 
campus (Blanket Hill) in the midst of a stu-
dent demonstration that had shifted its focus 
from protesting the invasion of Cambodia to 
the presence of the National Guard on cam-
pus. While some reports claim the shootings 
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were the result of an organized conspiracy by 
some of the guardsmen, most investigations 
suggest a far more complex set of circum-
stances involving a series of spontaneous 
adjustments by sets of demonstrators and 
National Guardsmen.14 Even the firing of guns 
by 28 guardsmen can be described as rela-
tively spontaneous; little, if any, concrete evi-
dence suggests the guardsmen received direct 
orders to open fire.
Among the contested reasons observers 
have given for the shootings, priming was 
unquestionably at work. First, tensions 
between student protesters and security agents 
were high because of the recurrent presence 
of the National Guardsmen on Ohio’s various 
campuses. As an Ohio congressman stated in 
an FBI report:
[B]y the first week in May, 1970, violence 
on Ohio’s state supported campuses was an 
old story. Few institutions had been spared. 
Governor Rhodes had already acquired a 
reputation for prompt and firm response; he 
had called out the National Guard forty 
times. In fact, Ohio’s expenditure for 
National Guard duty is said to have exceeded 
the total for all other forty-nine states during 
1968–70. (Best 1978:7)
Locally, the tensions between Kent State stu-
dents and the community were already boil-
ing with in-town demonstrations and what 
some called “rioting.” Further exacerbating 
the tension was the order for National Guards-
men to move from Akron, where they were 
monitoring a trucker’s strike, to Kent State’s 
campus on Saturday, May 2nd. With this 
move, the protesters’ target shifted from the 
war to the armed guards themselves, which 
primed both sides for a confrontation. Given 
the confluence of these contextual and inter-
actional factors, the fact that some guardsmen 
opened fire spontaneously is not surprising, 
especially in light of experimental research 
showing that the presence of guns can func-
tion as a potent cue that primes aggression, 
particularly when participants are angry and 
fearful (Berkowitz and LePage 1967; Turner 
and Leyens 1992). In the following section, 
we describe how ecological and spatial condi-
tions may further prime social control agents 
to react with spontaneous aggression.
Condition 4: Ecological/Spatial 
Contexts and Constraints
Ecological factors refer to spatial configura-
tions and arrangements, whether natural or 
built, that affect patterns of human settlement 
and interaction. The importance of ecological 
factors in shaping everyday life and extraordi-
nary events has been demonstrated in studies 
of architecture, crowding, and human vulner-
ability to various spatially produced dangers 
(Freedman 1975; Goffman 1971; Newman 
1973; Sommer 1974). Sewell (2001) and Tilly 
(2000) argue that spatial arrangements also 
affect contentious events, but the physical 
environment’s effect on protest was generally 
under-theorized until Zhao’s (1998, 2001) in-
depth analysis of the 1989 Beijing student 
movement and Tiananmen Square massacre.15
According to Zhao (2001:187), the ecol-
ogy of Beijing’s various universities signifi-
cantly affected student mobilization. Among 
the most important ecological factors was the 
proximity of most of Beijing’s 67 universities 
to each other, with most being less than 30 
minutes apart by bicycle; separation of most 
universities from the outside world by large 
walls; the dense campus living conditions, 
with a half dozen or more students living in 
the same room; the “total institution” charac-
ter of campus life; and spatial layouts that 
channeled students’ routines and activities. 
Student dormitories also became temporary 
homes for thousands of students who 
descended upon Beijing from outside to 
observe and join the student movement.
Together, these spatial characteristics con-
stituted an ecology that affected mobilization 
in a number of ways, including the generation 
of numerous spontaneous individual and col-
lective actions. Central locations on cam-
puses, such as Beijing University’s “Triangle,” 
became mobilizing locales for unplanned pro-
tests. Before the occupation of Tiananmen 
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Square, students who were “milling around” 
the Triangle heard a rumor that students from 
a nearby university had initiated street pro-
tests outside of their campus (Zhao 2001:253). 
Some students
. . . became very excited and wanted to stage 
a demonstration at Tiananmen Square as 
well. Only around two hundred students fol-
lowed them. These students marched inside 
the dormitory area first, however. As they 
shouted and made noise, more and more 
students were attracted and came out of 
their dormitories. The size of the formation 
gradually swelled . . . to between five and 
six thousand, and eventually they marched 
out of the campus. (Zhao 2001:253)
Zhao notes that many students spontaneously 
joined such demonstrations out of curiosity or 
excitement. He argues that students would not 
have successfully infiltrated Tiananmen 
Square on April 27, 1989, if not for the 
“marching and shouting” that took place on 
campus, which amassed thousands of students 
and “created an atmosphere of excitement and 
heightened the pitch of their anger” (Zhao 
2001:261). Because of this, the students col-
lectively overcame their fears of repression 
enough to leave the confines of their respec-
tive universities. Zhao’s account makes clear 
that ecological factors not only affected the 
emergence and character of the student move-
ment, but also made possible an array of spon-
taneous collective actions that later appeared 
to be preordained and coordinated. Because of 
these ecological factors, “many of their activi-
ties represented spontaneous and individualis-
tic responses to events rather than conscious 
decisions arrived at collectively by their 
organizations” (Zhao 2001:147).
Just as ecological factors may give rise to 
spontaneous mobilization processes, they 
may also stimulate unplanned responses by 
members of the security apparatus deployed 
to curb mobilization. In the cases of the Kent 
State shootings and the Bloody Sunday pro-
tests in Derry, the ecological layout of the 
protest scenes exacerbated the effects of 
unplanned repressive responses, leading to 
casualties. For example, in the Kent State 
incident, the fatality closest to the firing 
guardsmen was 20 yards away, whereas the 
furthest was about 250 yards away, with the 
remaining two somewhere in the middle. The 
answer to this puzzling pattern resided “in the 
topography of the area” (Best 1978:21–22). 
As explained in one analysis:
The pagoda on Blanket Hill is the high point 
of the area and shots fired over the heads of 
people twenty yards away would carry in a 
downward trajectory and inflict mortal 
wounds hundreds of yards away to people at 
whom the guardsmen weren’t aiming. Thus, 
the guardsmen who thought they were 
safely aiming over the heads of people 
nearby may have inflicted wounds on others 
quite some distance away.
If this account is correct, ecological factors 
accounted, in part, for the pattern of casual-
ties at Kent State.
The Bloody Sunday incident further illus-
trates how ecological factors can exacerbate 
the outcomes of spontaneous confrontations 
with social control agents. After the break-
down of the negotiated script described in 
Condition 2, Brigadier MacLellan refrained 
from giving the go-ahead for soldiers to con-
duct a “running battle” to make arrests 
because of the inability of army personnel to 
distinguish between so-called rioters and 
peaceful marchers (BSI 2010, v. 2:267). 
However, in violation of the brigadier’s order, 
Colonel Wilford ordered his Support Com-
pany to move into a designated “no go” area 
called the Bogside. Soldiers then chased civil-
ians through the Bogside, shooting 20 civil-
ians who were either fleeing or trying to help 
the injured. As described in the official 
Inquiry, the ecological layout of the Bogside 
contributed to the eventual use of lethal force:
Soldiers of Support Company had been told 
by officers and believed that this was a par-
ticularly dangerous area for the security 
forces, with any incursion running the risk 
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of meeting attacks by paramilitaries using 
bombs and firearms. . . . When they disem-
barked in the Bogside the soldiers were in 
an open area where they had never previ-
ously been and which was overlooked by 
the large and high blocks of the Rossville 
Flats, believed by them to be in a place from 
which republican paramilitaries operated. 
(BSI 2010, v. 1:81)
The order for soldiers to enter what was 
believed to be open enemy territory prompted 
them to cock “their weapons in order to fire 
without delay” (BSI 2010, v. 1:81) in breach 
of the military’s protocol for use of lethal 
force. The Inquiry reports that the commander 
of the Support Company was surprised to 
hear rifle fire and “had no idea what was actu-
ally going on” (BSI 2010, v. 1:97). In the 
Bogside, soldiers’ fear and tension was exac-
erbated by the area’s ecological arrangements, 
which led to heightened perceptions of threat. 
Additionally, the open space increased the 
protesters’ physically vulnerability to being 
hit by gunfire.
Because the ecological environment 
shapes social interactions and the “nature and 
possibility” of social protest (Sewell 2001:61), 
spatial factors may operate in combination 
with other conditions, such as heightened 
ambiguity and priming, to increase the likeli-
hood of spontaneous actions and confronta-
tions. As we will discuss, these factors can 
exacerbate preexisting tensions between 
groups on the scene and lead to violent out-
comes in spite of the implementation of pub-
lic order management systems.
DiSCuSSion
In this article we have sought to bring sponta-
neity back into the analysis of protest dynam-
ics and social movements by identifying a set 
of conditions under which spontaneity is most 
likely to be activated. We began by assessing 
the analytic treatment of spontaneity in the 
scholarly literature on protest and social 
movements, concluding that its treatment is 
conceptually and empirically misguided. 
Researchers have either temporally misap-
prehended and erroneously concretized the 
place and function of spontaneity, treating it 
as a static stage rather than as a dynamic ele-
ment within the collective action process, or 
ignored it entirely. Our argument is that spon-
taneous collective actions can occur at vari-
ous points in the career of protests and social 
movements, because the precipitating condi-
tions with which spontaneity is most likely to 
be associated are not clustered at any single 
point in the career of these collective phe-
nomena. Our illustrative cases demonstrate 
that spontaneous actions occurred at various 
points in these events, including after the dis-
ruption of a negotiated script, with the disso-
lution of the script, with the occurrence of 
non-scripted square-offs in the beginning of 
an event, during the dispersion process, and 
as a sideshow to the main event.
Importantly, we also observe that some 
spontaneous actions can be quite consequen-
tial for the ongoing dynamics of the collective 
actions in which they are embedded and for 
subsequent events. First, we find that sponta-
neity is a defining feature of some kinds of 
movements, such that it is woven into the 
movement’s operational fabric and thus is 
integral to its ongoing functioning. This 
clearly is the case with nonhierarchical move-
ments that espouse deliberative democratic 
participation, innovation, and creativity. 
Impromptu actions are understood by partici-
pants as necessary contributions to the move-
ment’s routines and its broader mission. The 
same is also true for membership in some 
religious movements, such as orthodox Quak-
erism, where spontaneous sharing by 
“friends” is determined by their God-given 
“inner light” rather than by authoritative invi-
tation or prior planning. For both religious 
and self-help movements, such as Alcoholics 
Anonymous, for which testimonial sharing is 
a salient organizational feature, the opportu-
nity to share is organizationally determined, 
but who shares, when, and what they share is 
often spontaneous. In this way, spontaneity is 
a defining and necessary feature of these 
movements’ organized functioning.
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Second, we submit that some kinds of 
spontaneous actions within the context of an 
ongoing protest event increase the probability 
of the occurrence of collective violence. 
Although research shows that interpersonal or 
intergroup violence is only an occasional con-
comitant of protest gatherings (McPhail and 
Wohlestein 1983), and although much of that 
research concludes that the violence that does 
occur is most likely due to interactions of 
police and protesters, little research inspects 
that interaction. However, a number of our 
observations shed some light on this puzzle, 
as they suggest that the occurrence of sponta-
neous actions associated with ambiguity-
induced script breakdown, script dissolution, 
and non-scripted square-offs increase the 
probability of violence.
Third, we find that spontaneous actions 
often produced a subsequent, spontaneously 
altered script or plan of action, which occurred 
in an episodic, contingent manner. By this, we 
mean that an adjustment by one set of actors 
within the field of protest led to an unplanned 
but primed adjustment by another set of 
actors. This occurred, for example, when the 
free speech gathering in the wake of the Kent 
State shootings marched spontaneously to the 
Akron campus administration building with 
the intent of “shutting it down” in response to 
a keynote to “strike, strike, shut it down!” 
Also illustrative of this dynamic are the 
unplanned violent reactions to the actions of 
protesters or counter-protesters, as occurred 
on Bloody Sunday and during the 1968 Chi-
cago Democratic convention (Walker 1969).16
A fourth outcome of spontaneous confron-
tations is that they may affect planning and 
negotiations for subsequent demonstrations, 
as we saw with the Klan rallies in Austin, 
Texas. Additionally, past collective actions, 
whether planned or spontaneous, may func-
tion as primers for future events. This occurred 
in the spontaneous “strike, strike, shut it 
down” march and in the civil disorders of the 
1960s, and it is likely the case with convivial 
campus gatherings that may escalate into col-
lective violence (McCarthy, Martin, and 
McPhail 2007).
Finally, spontaneous collective actions may 
also lead to the kinds of outcomes that gener-
ally have been thought possible only through 
highly organized strategic action. Particularly 
illustrative are eyewitness accounts of pro-
tester–police interactions in Cairo on January 
25, 2011; the wildcat strikes described by 
Fantasia (1988); and Stoltzfus’s (2001) 
accounts of the 1943 Rosenstrasse and Grosse 
Hamburger Strasse protest events in Berlin.
These outcomes of spontaneity are impor-
tant and consequential for the dynamics of the 
collective action events in which they are 
embedded and for subsequent events. As 
such, this study highlights the importance of 
recognizing spontaneous actions as salient 
aspects of protest events and social move-
ments. To dismiss or ignore their existence is 
to miss important elements of collective 
action dynamics.
In light of these observations, we suggest 
scholars of protest and movements have held to 
an “overly-organized” conception of these phe-
nomena over the past several decades. Piven 
and Cloward (1991:436) have argued similarly 
that protest is often analyzed “as more organ-
ized than it is, as if conventional modes of for-
mal organization also typify the organizational 
forms taken by protest.” Thus, to paraphrase 
Wrong’s (1961:191–92) erstwhile contention 
that humans are “social but not entirely social-
ized,” we contend that protest events and their 
movement sponsors are organized but not 
entirely organized. This is not to dismiss the 
organizational dimension of protests and social 
movements. Rather, it is to acknowledge and 
call for a more dialectical and interactionist 
conception of the various factors at play in their 
unfolding dynamics—a conception that focuses 
on the interplay between spontaneity and 
organization, rather than on their presumed 
antithetical opposition.
Our findings and conclusions are not only 
consistent with the logic of grounded theory 
on which they are based; they also are in 
keeping with the logic of qualitative compar-
ative analysis (Ragin 2000), in as much as we 
identify a set of conditions under which spon-
taneous collective actions are likely to occur 
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and show that these conditions are not mutu-
ally exclusive but may interact and combine 
to increase the probability of the occurrence 
of such actions. Identifying precisely the 
alternative pathways that can lead to different 
types of spontaneous collective actions 
remains to be done, but our analysis identifies 
empirically a set of precipitating conditions 
with which more refined empirical analyses 
might begin. Future analyses aside, our find-
ings call not only for reconsideration of the 
role of spontaneity in protests and move-
ments, but also for further recalibration of 
how it fits into theorizing about the dynamics 
of collective action more generally. Given our 
conceptualization of spontaneity as rooted in 
the intersection of symbolic interactionism 
and cognitive psychology, we believe our 
observations also apply to areas of inquiry 
beyond the study of collective action and thus 
call for empirical inquiry and theorization 
about the operation of spontaneity in the 
course of everyday life.
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notes
 1.  See Stinchcombe’s (2001) analysis of formality and 
when it works or applies.
 2.  Kahneman (2011:13, 20) describes fast thinking as 
“spontaneous” and “intuitive” rather than delibera-
tive and operating “automatically and quickly, with 
little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control.” 
As such, it happens in a “blink,” to use Gladwell’s 
(2005) popularized metaphor.
 3.  For concrete examples of these protest policing 
styles, see McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy 
(1998).
 4.  See della Porta and Reiter (1998) and McCarthy 
and McPhail (1998) for discussions of protest polic-
ing in Europe and the United States.
 5.  For example, spontaneity is neither discussed nor 
listed in the index of the Dynamics of Contention 
(McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001), The Blackwell 
Companion to Social Movements (Snow, Soule, and 
Kriesi 2004), or The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia 
of Social & Political Movements (Snow et al. 2013). 
Polletta’s (1998:137) analysis of black student sit-
ins in the American south might be taken as an 
exception to the neglect of spontaneity in movement 
studies, as she invokes spontaneity via the “meta-
phors of wildfire, fever, and contagion.” However, 
the question of whether there were moments of 
spontaneity in the sit-ins is bypassed by attribut-
ing spontaneity to students’ accounting practices. 
We do not take exception with Polletta’s empirical 
observations, but we do think the analysis reflects 
the tendency for movement theorizing to be couched 
in binary terms: if there is evidence of planning and 
organization, then reference to spontaneity is anti-
thetical other than as a narrating practice.
 6.  To accent the interactive interplay between organi-
zation and spontaneity is quite consistent with key 
organizing principles of symbolic interactionism 
(see Snow 2001, especially pages 369–71).
 7.  This interview was conducted as part of a separate 
project by the second author on the “Arab Spring 
Abroad” (human subject approvals #2012-8887 and 
#2012-8918, University of California-Irvine).
 8.  We place riots in quotation marks because it is not 
always clear that the collective actions to which 
the term is applied should be labeled as such. Even 
though “most social scientists have an intuitive 
sense of what constitutes a riot,” Myers (2013:1124) 
notes that “the edges of the definition are fuzzy,” 
often making it “difficult to determine whether or 
not some events are actually ‘riots.’” Addition-
ally, the term is sometimes used as a political label 
for contentious, unruly collective action engaged 
in by a challenging group or focuses attention on 
one segment of participants and implies something 
demeaning about them. Such concerns have been 
noted in relation to the “ghetto riots” of the 1960s 
in the United States (see Feagin and Hahn 1973: fn 
4, vi–vii). Thus, we question the presumption that 
riots constitute a pure or unambiguous form of col-
lective action and contend that the term should be 
used advisedly.
 9.  The researchers included the first author and then-
graduate students Leon Anderson, Robert Benford, 
and Steven Worden.
10.  Also referred to as Londonderry (see also Conway 
2010; Murray 2012; Pringle 2002).
11.  This and the following quotes are from the Al 
Jazeera English documentary Tweets from Tahrir 
(2012).
12.  Gladwell (2005:114) provides an explicit example 
in relation to basketball: “Basketball is an intricate, 
high-speed game filled with split-second, spontane-
ous decisions. But that spontaneity is possible only 
when everyone first engages in hours of highly 
repetitive and structured practice—perfecting their 
 by guest on October 25, 2014asr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
20  American Sociological Review 
shooting, dribbling, and passing and running plays 
over and over again—and agrees to play a carefully 
defined role on the court.”
13.  See Lieberson and Silverman (1965) for analysis 
of precipitants of race riots from 1913 to 1963. For 
additional summaries and assessment of research 
on the ghetto riots of the 1960s, see Feagin and 
Hahn (1973) and McPhail (1994).
14.  Of the many sources on the shootings and the flow of 
precipitating events, we draw from Scranton (1970) 
and Best (1978), which are primarily descriptive. 
For more analytic accounts, see the third section of 
essays in Hensley and Lewis (1978).
15.  See also Feagin and Hahn (1973), Gould (1995), 
and Heirich (1971), although they do not accent 
ecological factors as does Zhao.
16.  For an alternative view of the civil disorders associ-
ated with the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chi-
cago, see Kusch (2008), whose post-hoc interviews 
with the police suggest they conducted themselves as 
ordered by their superiors. Even so, prearranged direc-
tives from above do not necessarily prescribe the exact 
form and intensity of behavior, which can become 
spontaneously volatile during the heat of conflict.
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